Promoting gender equality in the new Scotland: rhetoric not reality by McKay, Ailsa & O'Hagan, Angela
Promoting gender equality in the new Scotland: rhetoric not reality
McKay, Ailsa; O'Hagan, Angela
Published in:




Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Link to publication in ResearchOnline
Citation for published version (Harvard):
McKay, A & O'Hagan, A 2009, 'Promoting gender equality in the new Scotland: rhetoric not reality', British
Politics Review: journal of the British Politics Society Norway, vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 12-13.
<http://www.britishpoliticssociety.no/British%20Politics%20Review>
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please view our takedown policy at https://edshare.gcu.ac.uk/id/eprint/5179 for details
of how to contact us.
Download date: 12. Nov. 2020
British Politics Review
Journal of the British Politics Society, Norway
Volume 4 | No. 2 | Spring 2009
Decentralising Britain
10 years of Scottish and Welsh devolution
CONTRIBUTORS
Peter Hain • John Redwood • Charlie Jeffery • Alan Trench
Ailsa McKay • Russell Deacon • Angela O’Hagan
David S. Moon • Atle L. Wold • Øivind Bratberg
British Politics Review
Volume 4 | No. 2 | Spring 2009
ISSN 1890-4505
British Politics Review is a quarterly 
newsletter issued by the British Politics 
Society, Norway. With contributions 
from academic and journalistic sour-
ces, the British Politics Review is aimed 
at everyone with a general interest in 
political developments in Britain.
British Politics Society, Norway is 
politically neutral and has no col-
lective agenda apart from raising the 
interest and knowledge of British 




Kristin M. Haugevik [Associate Editor]
Atle L. Wold [Scholarly Responsible]
John-Ivar S. Olsen [Secretary]
Postal address









The hemicycle of the Scottish Par-
liament (left) meets the adversarial 
structure of the House of Commons. 
Does devolution herald a new and 
more inclusive politics in Britain?
[© Scottish Parliamentary Corporate 
Body - 2009 (left). © Parliamentary copy-
right images are reproduced with the per-
mission of the UK Parliament (right).]
Manuscripts
Within a relatively broad framework, 
British Politics Review welcomes arti-
cles on British politics and society, 
preferably related to the thematic 
area set for each issue (announced in 
the previous issue and on our web-
site). Please contact the editors at 
mail@britishpoliticssociety.no
Subscriptions
100 NOK pr year
Please contact us at mail@britishpoli-
ticssociety.no or visit our website.
Editorial
Territorial innovation in a traditional state
”The Irish demand and the Welsh demand for devolution”, wrote a young Winston 
Churchill in The Times in 1904, ”ought not to go forward separately, but together 
hand in hand”. Churchill’s proposed solution was one of administrative Home 
Rule – delegating powers away from London while maintaining the superiority of 
Parliament. Such ideas of coordinated devolution to the constituent parts of Britain 
(promoted by Liberal voices as “Home Rule all around”) were never brought to 
fruition in the early 1900s. More than a century later, as the Scottish Parliament 
and the National Assembly for Wales celebrate their fi rst decade, asymmetry has 
become a defi ning feature of devolution. A set of institutions now exist in Scotland, 
Wales and Northern Ireland, each with different powers, interests and relations 
with London.
Devolution implied a strategy of granting limited measures of self-government to 
Scotland and Wales (Northern Ireland having its separate arrangements) while 
leaving untouched the powers and composition of the UK Parliament. Public 
fi nances, the unitary civil service and the social security system were intended 
to continue as before. The devolved administrations in Edinburgh and Cardiff 
have been granted tasks previously handled through the Scottish and Welsh 
Offi ces, thus democratising an existing administrative structure while leaving 
Parliament in Westminster intact. It was possible to contain the internal tension 
of the devolved settlement while times were good – with Labour dominating all 
three British governments, presiding over a healthy economy and a continuous 
growth in public spending. 
The times are not so good any more. Labour in London is now faced with a Labour/
Plaid Cymru coalition in Wales, a minority Scottish National Party government in 
Scotland, greater pressure on public fi nances and the likelihood of a Conservative 
UK Government by the summer of 2010. Political practice has shown the non-
revolutionary side of the SNP and PC, whose support seems to refl ect traditional 
left-right issues as much as claims for independence. While the process lingers 
on, the future is uncertain. Devolution is an unfolding experiment, “a process, not 
an event” as it was once described by Ron Davies, former secretary of state for 
Wales.
The present issue of British Politics Review marks the ten years that have passed 
since the fi rst devolved elections of 1999. Our eminent team of guest contributors 
includes Peter Hain, John Redwood, Charlie Jeffery, Ailsa McKay, Angela O’Hagan, 
Russell Deacon, Alan Trench and David S. Moon. Together, they address the broad 
canvas that is the devolved Britain of 2009: a political experiment in a conservative 
state which may see further reforms propel back to London in the years to come.
Øivind Bratberg and Kristin M. Haugevik, Editors
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Devolution in Wales has been an 
unquestionable success. Since that historic 
night when the referendum to establish it 
was so narrowly won in 1997, and the fi rst 
elections in 1999, the Welsh Assembly has 
evolved and matured.
Wales in 2009 is a more self-confi dent and 
outward looking nation than in 1999.  Ten 
years on the Welsh economy has been 
transformed albeit now badly hit like 
everywhere else by the global recession. 
Standards in health and education have 
risen and crime has fallen. The Assembly 
has pioneered made in Wales laws such 
as free prescriptions, free bus travel for 
pensioners and the smoking ban which 
England subsequently made law.  A 
Children’s Commissioner and Old Persons 
Commissioner have been other fi rsts for 
Wales under the Assembly which has also 
contained more women than any other 
legislature in the world.
After decades of voting Labour but 
enduring a Conservative government in 
Westminster Wales has benefi ted from 
having a Labour administration both in 
London and in Cardiff. With devolution 
democracy has come closer to the people 
of Wales.
It has been a long road to get to where we are 
today and a major new development was 
the Government of Wales Act 2006 which I 
introduced as Secretary of State for Wales. 
The groundbreaking act put primary law 
making powers on the statute ready to be 
activated once the people of Wales support 
such a change in a referendum. Meanwhile, 
for the last two years the Assembly has been 
getting to grips with their new enhanced 
legislative powers provided by the Act. 
The system has been streamlined so that 
Welsh Assembly Government priorities for 
legislation are secured 
more quickly and easily.
The Act settled once and 
for all the constitutional 
debate in Wales 
allowing the Assembly 
to focus on delivering 
the right policies for the 
people of Wales. Since 
2007 when the Act came 
into force the Assembly 
has gone from strength 
to strength, even though 
the new process has been a steep learning 
curve for both Cardiff Bay and Westminster. 
Essentially it has replaced the need for Bills 
to be introduced at Westminster granting 
extra powers, with Legislative Competence 
Orders that go through much more quickly 
and therefore frequently.
So where next? Devolution has come 
on leaps and bounds but now is time 
to let the settlement bed down, for the 
Assembly members to get used to the 
new powers and for the people of Wales 
to understand much better what goes 
on in Cardiff Bay. Opinion polls show 
that public support for the Assembly has 
risen.  Welsh Government Ministers are 
becoming household names and Welsh 
news reports are dominated by events 
from the Assembly.
It is easy to get carried away with the 
success of devolution and forget that the 
system is still quite young. Finding its 
feet is key to future success. This is not 
a time to start calling for a referendum 
to activate full law making powers as 
some are advocating. Public opinion may 
have warmed to the Assembly but the 
jury is still out on giving it more powers. 
Currently there is no consensus amongst 
the public about the need for 
primary powers. Without 
a signifi cant shift in public 
opinion it is very clear to 
me that a referendum to 
introduce them would be 
lost.
As a supporter of primary 
powers and a pro-
devolutionist, when the time 
is right I’ll be campaigning 
for the referendum but it will 
not happen overnight, in my 
view not until we are well into the next 
decade at least. The Wales we see today is 
signifi cantly different to Wales ten years 
ago and this is down to devolution and the 
impact it’s had. But devolution is a work in 
progress and in the next ten years it will 
continue to evolve.
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Devolution ten years on: past achievements and ideas for the future
Peter Hain 
(Labour) is a 
former secreta-
ry of state for 
Wales (2002-
08). Among a 
number of mi-
nisterial briefs, 
he has also been 
secretary of 
state for Northern Ireland (2005-
07) and for work and pensions 
(2007-08) as well as Leader of the 
House of Commons (2003-05). First 
elected to Parliament in 1991, Hain 
is an important contributor to 
public debates on issues such as de-
mocratic renewal, electoral reform 
and devolution.
By British Politics Review Guest Writer Peter Hain, Member of Parliament for Neath
”This is not a time 
to start calling for a 
referendum to activate 
full law making powers 
as some are advocating. 
Public opinion may have 
warmed to the Assembly 
but the jury is still out on 
giving it more powers.” 
Facts on devolution
Devolution refers to the regionalisation  or decentralisation  
of political power in the UK. It has been used as a label for 
various designs of self-government in Ireland, Scotland 
and Wales. Historically, the concept was often used to 
denote a limited form of Home Rule, under which the 
supremacy of London would be maintained.
In Ireland, the question was given a separate solution 
with the establishment of the Irish Free State (1922). 
The particular signifi cance of Scottish interests 
were acknowledged by the UK government with the 
introduction of the Scottish Offi ce (from 1885) headed by 
a secretary for Scotland (from 1926 elevated to a secretary 
of state). Similar institutions for Wales came much later, 
the Welsh Offi ce with a secretary of state being introduced 
by Harold Wilson’s Labour government in 1964-65.
The  Royal Commission on the Constitution (1969-73) 
considered a range of territorial models for the UK, and 
concluded by favouring directly elected assemblies for 
Scotland and Wales.
Scottish and Welsh referanda in 1979 failed to produce 
suffi cient majorities in support of devolution.
The incoming Labour government in 1997 introduced 
referenda for a Scottish Parliament (with primary 
legislative and limited tax-varying powers) and a National 
Assembly for Wales (with secondary legislative and no 
tax-varying powers).
The two legislatures (supported in by 74,3% in Scotland 
and a marginal 50,3% in Wales) were introduced by Acts 
of Parliament in 1998 and the fi rst elections were held on 
6 May 1999.
When the Labour government first 
introduced plans for devolved 
parliaments in Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland back in 1997, I warned 
that far from strengthening the United 
Kingdom, devolution would actually 
make it weaker. Ten years after the first 
elections to the new Scottish Parliament 
and the National Assembly for Wales, 
Alex Salmond sits in Bute House as 
Scotland’s first nationalist First Minister, 
Labour and Plaid Cymru coexist 
uneasily in a coalition government in 
Cardiff, and more and more people 
in England question the benefit of a 
union that withstood the challenges 
of Jacobitism, industrialisation, the 
Napoleonic campaigns and two world 
wars.
The problem with the devolution 
settlement is essentially one of 
fairness. Now that Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland elect representatives 
to their own parliaments to deal with 
matters that affect only these parts of 
the United Kingdom, people in England 
now question why MPs 
from Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland can vote 
on exclusively English 
matters. As the MP for 
a Scottish constituency, 
Gordon Brown can make 
decisions on a range of 
policies such as health, 
education and housing in 
England, but any decisions 
he makes will not affect 
his own constituents 
because these matters 
are all devolved to the 
Scottish Parliament. 
The Chancellor, Alistair 
Darling, has to decide how best to 
allocate money for schools, hospitals 
and the police in England, but he cannot 
decide how much money is spent on 
these services in his home country of 
Scotland, as this is also an issue that is 
now the responsibility of Holyrood.
Many of the controversial measures 
introduced by this government which 
effect only England have been passed 
despite most English MPs voting against 
them. The government had to rely on 
the votes of Scottish MPs to introduce 
foundation hospitals and top-up tuition 
fees in England, yet neither Scottish nor 
English MPs in Westminster were able 
to vote to bring in the same measures in 
Scotland. The fact that people in England 
feel this is unfair should not have come 
as a surprise to the government. It was 
first identified as a risk back in the 1970s, 
when it was dubbed the West Lothian 
Question after the MP who raised fears 
that it would damage the integrity of 
the union.
Allied to this is a feeling that public 
spending in Scotland and Wales is much 
more generous than it 
is in England. Owing 
to the Barnett Formula, 
the government’s 
preferred method 
of calculating how 
public expenditure 
should be distributed 
throughout the United 
Kingdom, people 
in Scotland receive 
£8.623 per head of 
public spending each 
year.  People in Wales 
receive £8.139, and in 
Northern Ireland the 
figure is £9,385, but 
the English receive only £7,121.
The situation is actually more 
complicated than it appears. These 
figures mask regional variations in 
public spending in England. Londoners, 
for example, receive the highest level of 
public spending in the UK. The Scottish 
Parliament receives its funding via a 
block grant from the Treasury, meaning 
that if it wishes to increase spending 
on, say, healthcare, it either has to raise 
taxes or cut expenditure elsewhere in 
Scotland. But owing to Alex Salmond’s 
support for populist spending policies 
in Scotland, such as free prescriptions 
and care for the elderly, the general 
feeling in England is that the system 
gives the Scots a better deal than the 
English.  This was a minor irritation 
during the good economic times. In the 
current climate the English’s tolerance 
threshold is likely to be a lot lower.
Devolution has weakened, not strengthened, the United Kingdom
By British Politics Review Guest Writer John Redwood, Member of Parliament for Wokingham
John Redwood 
(the Conserva-
tive Party) is a 
former secretary 
of state for 
Wales (1993-95). 
A Member of 
Parliament since 
1987, he also 
served in the 
shadow Cabinet in 1997-2000 and 
2004-05. Redwood is a prolifi c wri-
ter on issues such as the European 
Union and British constitutional 
affairs. Having contested the party 
leadership in 1995 and 1997, he 
today chairs the No Turning Back 
Group and the party’s policy re-
view on economic competitiveness.
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”For English patriots 
like myself, it is 
disheartening to 
see the government 
so reluctant to 
acknowledge England 
as a distinct nation 
with a right to the 
same representation 
as that enjoyed by 
the other nations of 
Britain.” 
Devolution’s architectural face. The new buildings of the Scottish Parliament (left) and the National Assembly for Wales (right) have given authority and 
a sense of permance to the devolved settlement - but they have also proved to be hugely costly projects.                                                             photograph: public domain
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Devolution has weakened, not strengthened the UK (cont.)
By John Redwood
A few years ago, the government sought 
to paint over the cracks they have created 
in the United Kingdom by breaking 
England up into artificial regions with 
their own elected assemblies. This was 
deeply unpopular, and in the only 
region where people were allowed a 
say the overwhelming majority were 
opposed to the plan. The regional 
boundaries selected by the government 
were artificial and based on the huge 
constituencies used for elections to the 
European Parliament elections. This 
solution ignored the fact that what the 
English opposed was not just the West 
Lothian Question, but the government’s 
ambiguity over whether such a nation 
as “England” existed at all. The British-
Irish Council, for example, is made up 
of representatives from the UK, Ireland, 
Ulster, Scotland and Wales, but not from 
England.
We have a secretary of state for Wales (a 
title that I, as an English MP, was proud 
to hold in the 1990s), a secretary of state 
for Scotland and a secretary of state 
for Northern Ireland. These cabinet 
positions may have been necessary 
when the UK was a unitary state. But 
now these nations have devolved 
parliaments, and the UK cabinet 
spends most of its time dealing with 
English affairs, it is unfair that we 
do not also have a secretary of state 
for England, or an English first 
minister, representing the interests 
of England to a UK government. We 
have ministers for the South East 
of England, for the North West or 
for the Midlands, yet Scotland and 
Wales are not broken up in this way 
with a minister for the Highlands 
or a minister for the Lothians.  For 
English patriots like myself, it is 
disheartening to see the government 
so reluctant to acknowledge England 
as a distinct nation with a right to the 
same representation as that enjoyed 
by the other nations of Britain.
I am not a pessimist and, while Britain 
has been weakened by devolution, 
I do not believe that a break up of 
the country is inevitable, nor is it 
necessary to split the country for the 
English to gain fair representation 
once again. Now that the devolved 
assemblies have been established 
and proven popular in Scotland and 
Wales, I do not think a Conservative 
government would be in any position 
to abolish them. David Cameron has 
wisely opted to make devolution 
work, and has indicated that he 
would seek accommodation with 
administrations in Edinburgh and 
Cardiff made up of other parties.
Some have suggested that what is needed 
is an English Parliament. I do not agree 
that we should repeat the mistakes 
made in Scotland and Wales in terms of 
building large expensive buildings and 
a layer of extra politicians at taxpayers’ 
expense.  But I would 
like to see the return of 
an English Parliament 
to its historic home in 
Westminster.
Everything which is 




and law and order, 
should be considered 
only by English 
MPs meeting as the 
English Parliament 
in Westminster. This 
would give England 
the same devolved powers enjoyed in 
Scotland, create a stronger sense of 
English identity around the traditional 
Parliament of England, and avoid any 
extra costs and hassles associated with 
devolution in Scotland and Wales. 
English MPs are more than capable of 
performing a dual role, as Members of 
an English Parliament and Members of 
a UK Parliament. English MPs could 
elect a first minister, 
and a secretary of 
state for England 
could be appointed to 
represent England’s 
interests in a UK 
cabinet. Once our 
colleagues in Scotland 
and Wales see how 
well this system 
worked for England, 
they may realise the 
advantages and adopt 
such a system for 
their own devolved 
administrations.
I am a passionate 
believer in our country, but I am 
also a believer in democracy. Should 
Scottish or Welsh MPs seek a vote on 
independence, they should be entitled 
to do so, just as English MPs should be 
entitled to do the same for their country 
if they feel it is what their electors 
seek. I believe most of us want to 
keep our country together. This is 
why the government’s timidity with 
regards to the English question is so 
frustrating. Given their enthusiasm 
for devolution, they should extend 
this to England and offer the English a 
say on whether they too wish the same 
benefits as those given to Scotland 
and Wales. Public opinion would be 
on their side, and by resolving the 
anomalies of one-sided devolution 
they would strengthen the country 
while allowing the flexibility for 
each of our four nations to pass laws 
in the way they see fit and celebrate 
their own culture.
This is not a party political issue. On 
the basis of the last three election 
results, the Labour Party would 
have had just as much chance of 
controlling an English Parliament 
as a UK one. Given that they now 
have an SNP administration in 
Scotland, a coalition government in 
Wales, no representation in Northern 
Ireland, and a Conservative mayor 
of London, an English Parliament 
may offer Labour chances for having 
at least some influence after future 
elections.
”I do not agree that 
we should repeat the 
mistakes made in 
Scotland and Wales in 
terms of building large 
expensive buildings 
and a layer of extra 
polit icians at taxpayers’ 
expense.  But I would 
l ike to see the return of 
an English Parl iament 
to its historic home in 
Westminster.” 
Medieval precedence. The English Parliament meets 
before King Edward 1st, c. 1278. In this picture, ironically, 
Alexander 3rd of Scotland and Llywelin the last of Wales are 
also seated with the king despite the fact that they are not 




to Scotland and Wales 
has introduced a new 
legislative level in the 
UK and given the two 
nations a legitimate 
infl uence over their 
own affairs. From this 
perspective, devolution 
has been a democratic 
success. Yet, there 
are signs that the 
current settlement is 
unsustainable over 
time, due to a number 
of contradictions. Four 
features in particular 
point themselves 
out as unresolved 
under the current 
devolution settlement: 
 
a) the failure to consider what impact 
changes in the government of one UK 
nation might have on other UK nations
b) the absence of clear alternatives 
for the un-devolved government 
of England in a part-devolved UK
c) the lack of strategies for managing 
the relationships between the 
different governments within the UK
d) the absence of a clear strategy for 
the UK union, following devolution
To be blunt: the post-devolution 
political system was not designed as 
an integrated system of government. 
This lack of integrated design is a long-
standing tradition in UK government. 
The UK state grew (and in Ireland later 
contracted) through a set of relationships 
between England and the other nations 
in which England was always the sole 
common denominator. The UK state 
was always asymmetrically organised, 
with a generally and over time 
increasingly uniform approach to public 
administration in England, and different 
sets of distinctive arrangements for public 
administration, with varying degrees 
of policy discretion and institutional 
underpinning, in the other nations. 
The relationship of the English core 
and the other nations has always been a 
piecemeal one; changes to administrative 
arrangements in, say, Scotland did not 
lead to equivalent changes in Wales 
or (Northern) Ireland. Relationships 
were always bilateral and partial, not 
multilateral and statewide. The UK 
union remained curiously disconnected 
between its non-English parts.
That tradition of disconnection was 
continued in 1997-99. Different UK 
government departments were in charge 
of drafting the reforms for Scotland, 
Wales and Northern Ireland respectively. 
A half-hearted and then aborted attempt 
was then made in 2002-4 to add English 
regional reform, but the fi rst, and so far 
only, referendum which was held – in the 
North-East region in 2004 – ended with 
a clear majority of 78% voting against 
. These reforms were introduced for 
different reasons in different places, 
and were discussed in government and 
parliament for the most part as discrete 
issues. This characteristically piecemeal 
and un-coordinated approach has a 
number of problematic consequences.
First, approaching each reform as a 
discrete renegotiation of 
the relationship of one 
part of the UK to the UK 
as a whole carried with it 
the danger of spillovers, 
that is, the unanticipated 
impact of reforms designed 
to meet a need in one part 
of the UK, on another.
James Mitchell has 
highlighted the most 
obvious example: while 
devolution in Scotland was 
addressed at a Scottish 
need (to re-legitimise 
the UK system of government after a 
protracted period of being governed in 
Westminster by a Conservative Party 
that had minimal support in Scotland), 
one consequence has been to open up 
perceptions in England that Scottish 
devolution is unfair to the English: in 
terms of political representation (the West 
Lothian Question); in the distribution of 
resources (Scotland, for historic reasons 
unconnected to the devolution reforms, 
has a block grant from the UK Treasury 
which awards more public spending per 
capita than England); and in terms of policy 
provision (where post-devolution policy 
innovations in Scotland such as reduced 
prescription charges and fee-free higher 
education are not available in England).
In consequence there has been further 
debate about how to address these 
perceptions of inequity, including 
proposals to restrict Scottish MPs’ rights 
at Westminster, so that they can vote on 
UK-wide matters only, and/or to devolve 
fuller tax-raising powers 
to the Scottish Parliament 
beyond the current + / 
- 3% of income tax, so 
that public spending 
in Scotland is fi nanced 
more fully by Scottish 
taxpayers and less by 
the general UK taxpayer. 
The risk is, of course, 
that addressing these 
spillovers of Scottish 
devolution into England 
in the same piecemeal 
way as the earlier 
Scottish reforms were 
introduced will add further spillovers, 
for example concerning perceptions of 
unfairness in Scotland about ”second 
class” status at Westminster, or demands 
in Wales to obtain similar tax-raising 
powers for the Welsh Assembly, and so 
on. The prospect is one of continual fl ux.
A second consequence of the piecemeal 
approach to reform in 1997-99 concerns 
the relationships between England 
and the rest. England is one of the most 
centralised political units among liberal 
democracies. It is also, in relative terms, 
very big: around ten times the size of 
Scotland, 17 times the size of Wales and 
30 times the size of Northern Ireland. 
The combination of one unit of large size 
and centralised government alongside 
smaller units with extensive devolution 
is, in comparative terms, unique. It brings 
with it its own spillovers. Irrespective 
of the formal distribution of powers, 
decisions taken by Westminster for 
England inevitably spill over into areas of 
devolved responsibility given England’s 
predominance on the UK’s single market, 
single welfare state and single internal 
security area. They do so all the more 
given the ways that the government of 
England is fused (and often confused) 
with the government of the UK in the 
institutions of Westminster and Whitehall. 
Four things wrong with the status quo
By Charlie Jeffery
Charlie Jeffery is a 
Professor at the Dept 
of Politics and Interna-
tional Relations, Uni-
versity of Edinburgh, 
specialising in devolu-
tion and comparative 
territorial politics. 
Jeffery directed the 
Economic and Social 
Research Council’s 
research programme on 
“Devolution and Con-
stitutional Change” 
from 2000 to 2006.
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Revised powers in a devolved state. Should Scottish MPs 
still vote in the House of Commons on issues that only 
pertain to England and Wales?
© Parliamentary copyright images are reproduced with the permission of 
the UK Parliament.
”The UK operates 
after devolution 
as a collection of 
governments working 
side by side in a sense 
by default, rather 
than because they are 
joined in some kind of 
common endeavour in 
service of the citizens 
of the UK.”
Moreover, where UK institutions act 
for the UK as a whole the mindset 
of decision-making is, logically 
enough, dominated by the largest 
part, England, and equally logically 
neglectful of interests outside 
England or effects in devolved 
settings. Finally, because it is in this 
way ”captured” by English interests, 
the UK government is ill-placed to 
arbitrate concerns or confl icts over 
spillovers between jurisdictions.
That this mix of devolution outside 
England and centralisation of 
England has not been understood as 
an integrated system of government 
is confi rmed, third, by the practices 
the UK uses for coordinating the work 
of its different governments. These 
have projected forward an approach 
to the accommodation of different 
territorial interests inherited from 
pre-devolution UK government. 
That approach sees coordination as an ad 
hoc process, lubricated by assumptions 
of civil service collegiality, referred to 
ministers only in case of dispute, and 
carried out entirely beyond public view. 
It was, no doubt, appropriate to the pre-
devolution situation. It functioned more 
or less adequately from 1999-2007 when 
Labour led governments at the UK level 
and in Scotland and Wales (and when 
Northern Irish devolution was in the 
main suspended), and dispute could be 
managed within the Labour Party ”family”. 
But it appears unfi t for purpose now 
the Scottish National Party (the SNP) 
forms the Scottish government, Labour 
is in coalition with Plaid Cymru, (the 
Welsh nationalist party) in Wales, and 
Northern Ireland devolution, with its 
distinctive party system, is in operation 
again. Ad hockery and intransparency do 
not appear well-suited to managing the 
growing number of intergovernmental 
disputes, especially between Scotland 
and the UK, allowing accusations of 
duplicity and grandstanding to be made 
on both sides. More importantly there 
is minimal provision in this practice 
of intergovernmental coordination 
for identifying and pursuing 
common interests shared between 
governments across jurisdictions. 
To put this last point another way, there is no 
apparent sense of the need, or desirability, 
of the UK’s different governments to 
join together to make policy across their 
different jurisdictions for the union as 
a whole. This is a striking absence. It 
expresses the fourth consequence of 
piecemeal devolution: the purpose of 
union, in its post-devolution form, is 
unclear and under-articulated. The UK 
operates after devolution as a collection of 
governments working side by side in a sense 
by default, rather than because they are 
joined in some kind of common endeavour 
in service of the citizens of the UK. 
Gordon Brown’s discussion of Britishness 
and British values is an attempt to 
suffuse this disconnected political system 
with some kind of commonality, but 
appears fl awed and insuffi cient, resting 
too strongly on universal values of 
western liberal democracy which might 
just as well provide a case for English 
union with Germany as with Scotland. 
What is missing is a more explicit 
articulation of the shared interests that 
all UK citizens might draw from the 
union in its new, post-devolution form. 
A glance at other devolved and federal 
systems gives some pointers. Germany 
and Australia operate systems of fi scal 
equalisation based on commitments 
that all citizens should enjoy 
similar levels of provision of public 
services, despite the existence of a 
tier of decentralised government. 
Canada and Belgium have 
signifi cantly more decentralised and 
diverse sub-state governments, but 
in each case diversity is bounded 
by continued commitments to a 
statewide ”social union” in Canada 
and a statewide social security 
system in Belgium; diversity is highly 
prized, yet still tempered by explicit 
commitments to statewide solidarity.
The UK has failed to problematise the 
balance between the commitment to 
diversity which devolution embodies, 
and the commitment to solidarity 
and equity which a continued 
union implies. There has been no 
general articulation of the balance of 
interests that might best be secured 
for citizens at a statewide scale, and those 
that might best be secured for citizens 
in each of the four nations of the UK. 
There has been no explicit distinction of 
those policy outcomes that can or should 
vary across jurisdictions, and those that 
should not and should be delivered for 
all citizens uniformly no matter where 
they live. And fi nally, there has been no 
systematic discussion of the allocation of 
resources between levels of government 
as a means of achieving balance between 
territorial diversity and statewide fairness. 
As a result the post-devolution state lacks 
generally understood, and generally 
accepted, rules of the game which might 
offer a general rather than a piecemeal 
framework for addressing the concerns 
and relationships of the UK’s component 
nations, consider more systematically the 
government of England and connect it 
to government outside of England, and 
inform a practice of intergovernmental 
coordination capable of pursuing statewide 
objectives and balancing them against 
devolved autonomy. In sum, the UK has 
failed to identify how ”Britishness” – in 
this sense some conception of the interests 
shared by all citizens, across all UK-level, 
English and devolved jurisdictions – can 
be understood, debated and delivered 
by the post-devolution political system.
Four things wrong with the status quo (cont.)
By Charlie Jeffery
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The West Lothian Question...
...is so called because it was repeatedly emphasised by Tam 
Dalyell, the Labour MP for the constituency of West Lothian 
in Scotland (and long-time opponent of devolution).  Dalyell 
raised the issue prior to the fi rst referendum on devolution 
to Scotland in 1979. The question has two parts:
1. Why should Scottish MPs be able to vote on legislation 
pertaining only to England and Wales, when English and 
Welsh MPs cannot vote on Scottish legislation (since this 
will be handled by the Scottish Parliament)?
2. Why should Scottish MPs be able to vote on all legislation 
except that which concerns the part of the UK they have 
been elected to represent – Scotland?
The rule of London. When the Welsh Offi ce was established by the 
British government in 1965, it was a cautious recognition that Wales 
was different from English regions. After devolution, most of its 
powers have been devolved to the National Assembly for Wales, the 




The other disputed 
Union. In British party 
politics, European 
integration has always 
been an intricate issue 
to deal with, cutting 
across (occasionally 
coming close to ripping 
apart) both Labour and 
the Conservative Party 
and remaining an object 
of hatred for those who 
wish to make the UK a 
fully sovereign state yet 
again.
Disputed and diffi cult as the EU issue 
has been from the London perspective, 
is it any different when perceived from 
Scotland and Wales? Clearly, the dynamic 
of party politics is different here, with 
prominent nationalist parties fi ghting 
the UK-wide parties in their Scottish or 
Welsh appearance. In Scotland, devolution 
has led to extensive reform of  Labour 
and the Conservative Party (the Liberal 
Democrats are kept aside here, established 
as a federalised party prior to devolution). 
Both Labour and the Conservatives have 
moved towards more decentralised 
structures and more openness towards 
policy divergence between London and 
the subnational.
Strengthening the Scottish dimension of 
party branches has obvious implications 
in devolved policy areas  such  as health 
and education (cf. the argument of a more 
left-leaning party politics in both nations 
compared with England). With regard to 
the EU, policy divergence is less obvious 
but just as intriguing. Europe has been 
a divisive issue in Scotland as in Britain 
as a whole: yet, party branches here have 
learnt to lean upon a shared regional 
profi le of ”protecting Scotland” which 
distinguishes Scottish party branches 
when EU issues are on the table.
There is an interesting backdrop to these 
developments  in the idea of a Europe of 
the regions, much lauded in the 
early 1990s when the regional 
signifi cance of the EU structural 
funds and the introduction of the 
Committee of the Regions in the 
Maastricht Treaty (1992) together 
seemed to herald a new era for 
regional politics. This coincided 
with a strengthening of demands 
for regional autonomy in several 
EU member states. The process 
towards devolution in Scotland 
and Wales fi nds certain parallels in 
countries such as Spain, Italy and 
Belgium. Regional autonomy at 
home has in all these contexts been 
expected to have consequences 
for the representation in EU 
institutions.
In Britain, devolution and European 
integration could thus be seen as parallel 
challenges to the authority of London. The 
coupling of these challenges is particularly 
clear when a direct relationship emerges 
between Edinburgh and Brussels. Such 
bypass of London may have been the 
SNP’s line of reasoning when the party 
turned towards a more positive attitude 
to the EU in the early 1990s. From an 
altogether different starting point, Scottish 
Labour could also see clear advantages 
in a pro-European approach: an active 
Scotland contained within a British state 
yet combined with minimum labour 
standards, environmental regulation 
and other mildly progressive standards 
ensured by the EU. Within 
Labour, the Thatcher era was 
thus decisive in opening the 
party towards both devolution 
and European integration. As 
a fi nal twist to this narrative, 
the Scottish Conservatives 
- faced with the devolved 
settlement of 1997 - found 
that a constructive approach 
to the EU could be a source 
of Scottishness and renewal - 
a quiet demarcation from the 
sometimes virulent Euroscepticism of the 
party in London.
With devolution a decade old, the 
experience of representing Scotland 
in Europe has been mixed – from the 
point of view of each of these parties. 
Signifi cantly, elections for the European 
Parliament are now proportional and 
regionally organised, with Scotland and 
Wales installed as electoral constituencies 
alongside Northern Ireland and nine 
English regions. This has added to the 
sense of a ”Scottish bench” in the European 
Parliament. Moreover, the Scottish 
government has its own representation 
in Brussels and Scottish civil servants are 
part of the British team in the EU Council 
when regional issues are discussed.
However, precisely all what this has 
meant in terms of promoting Scottish 
interests is unclear. Members of the 
European Parliament may draw 
attention towards agriculture, fi sheries 
and regional funds. But member states 
remain the basic building blocks in the 
decision-making structures of the EU, 
a truth which German Länder and other 
aspiring territorial units have also learnt 
to accept. The EU adds an additional layer 
to domestic politics - sometimes useful, 
sometimes burdensome. Whether this 
add-on to domestic politics is a good 
or bad development is in the eye of the 
observer. What is clear, however, is that 
the layers are now so integrated that few 
political battles can be fought on one 
battlefi eld alone. Scottish 
politics is enacted not only 
in Edinburgh or London, but 
at multiple levels of which 
Europe is one.
Couple this territorial 
division of power with 
depoliticisation and the 
market forces, and you 
have what is fashionably 
called multi-level governance: 
less authority vested at the 
national level, and indeed less authority 
vested in the political system as a whole, as 
European directives, public agencies and 
the market take over powers previously 
residing in the national political system.
Is this a development to be regretted? 
To those who look with nostalgia 
to powerful national legislatures it 
certainly is. Scotland and Wales are part 
of a new European settlement, where 
sovereignty and independence are less 
obvious categories than before and where 
political power has been diluted. The 
role of the EU in this development is a 
matter of interpretation. In the context 
on devolution, for example, the EU 
can be taken to support either Scottish 
independence in Europe or something closer 
to integration in a  multi-level Europe of 
devolution plus the EU.
Among both nationalists and 
moderate devolutionists, the EU 
commands less enthusiasm in 
Scotland than what was envisioned 
ten to fi fteen years ago. However, 
for all the limitations to the vision 
of a Europe of the regions, EU 
policies are signifi cant to Scotland, 
as they are for Wales. 
The fi rst decade of devolution has 
seen a range of development below 
as well as above the authorities 
in London. Scottish and Welsh 
approaches to Europe will help 
defi ne the path for devolution in 
the decade to come.
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”Scotland and 
Wales are part of 
a new European 
settlement, where 
sovereignty and 
i n d e p e n d e n c e 
are less obvious 
categories than 
before.”
Øivind Bratberg is 
a PhD fellow at the 
Dept. of Political 
Science, Univer-
sity of Oslo and 
President of British 
Politics Society, 
Norway.
Scottish in Europe. Could - and should - the Scottish government play an 
autonomous role in the EU?                     © the Scottish Government
Labour, and Welsh too. 
From the instigation  of 
devolution in Wales, 
the role of architect has 
largely been played by 
the Labour Party. In 
the establishment and 
development of the formal 
governance systems, as 
well as the institution of 
the non-formal aspects 
of post-devolution 
politics, Labour’s role 
can be seen as decisive.
This is important 
to recognise. Much 
discussion of Britain’s multi-level system 
of governance treats governmental levels/
institutions as individual ”personalities”; 
each level acting for its own particular 
ends: e.g. ”the ’Welsh Assembly’ seeking 
greater powers from ’Westminster’”. Yet 
governmental institutions are essentially 
controlled by parties – in the case of the 
Assembly, Welsh Labour, whether alone 
or in coalition with the Lib Dems or 
Plaid Cymru. Thus, any analysis of how 
formal systems of governance operate 
(and may alter) necessitates consideration 
of parties, their intra-party relations, 
confl icts and political discourses. 
Labour’s historically dominant political 
position in Wales, and its hefty majorities in 
the UK Parliament, means that understanding 
its approach to governing is imperative to 
understand the course of Welsh devolution. 
Regarding the Assembly’s constitution at its 
establishment, for example, former Secretary 
of State for Wales Ron Davies pointed out 
that it was ”all very well for academics and arm-
chair critics to devise grandiose schemes which 
satisfi ed constitutional theories but unless there 
was support for the proposals within the Labour 
Party … then such schemes were pretty futile.” 
The ensuing history of the devolved 
settlement can, similarly, be seen largely 
as that of an internal Labour Party debate. 
Yet, if Labour has profoundly affected 
how devolution has played out in Wales, 
how has this new political situation 
simultaneously affected the party itself? 
In approaching this question it is useful to 
bear the concepts of autonomy and infl uence 
in mind. The fi rst refers to the ability of the 
party at the devolved level (e.g. the Welsh 
Labour Party) to conduct its affairs free of 
interference from the party at the central 
level (e.g. the British Labour Party) while the 
second refers to the extent to which the party 
at the devolved level impacts on decisions 
made by the central party. In making 
judgements as to these two factors it is useful 
to consider both the aforementioned formal 
and non-formal elements of post-devolution 
Welsh politics; particularly the policies and 
rhetoric of Welsh Labour in government.
In terms of policies, under the leadership 
of Rhodri Morgan AM Labour in the 
Assembly has, in certain areas, charted a 
markedly different direction from Labour 
in Westminster. In health, for example, it 
has spurned the ”competitive model” of 
public service provision and primary focus 
upon cutting waiting lists adopted by the 
party in England. Instead, it has pursued a 
”public health” approach aimed at targeting 
ill-health in general via 
a charge-cutting agenda 
– scrapping prescription 
charges and instituting, 
among other things, free 
swimming for the young 
and elderly, free optical 
examinations for over-
60s, free school breakfasts 
and free milk for under-
eights – and ruled out the 
private fi nance initiative 
(PFI) and foundation 
hospitals in Wales. 
Under the devolved system, 
therefore, in terms of its 
ability to take different policy approaches to 
the party at the centre, Welsh Labour clearly 
has a good deal of autonomy. On the other 
hand, policywise, Welsh Labour doesn’t 
appear to have much infl uence; there seems 
little sign that their different policy route has 
signifi cantly impacted thinking within the 
central party leadership which has continued 
with PFI, waiting list targets et cetera.
A similar pattern emerges when surveying 
the party in Wales’s rhetoric, which is 
premised upon Welsh particularity. Labour’s 
leadership in the Assembly have utilised 
two key rhetorical tropes to articulate their 
policy agenda: ”made in Wales” and ”clear 
red water”. Analysing these rhetorics can 
tell us much about Welsh Labour’s self-
positioning post-devolution and what it 
has meant for both its autonomy within 
and infl uence over the wider Labour Party.
For example, the rhetoric of ”made in Wales” 
policies performs a double task, linking 
together disparate policies into a semblance 
of unifi ed thinking and legitimising and 
justifying the choice of said policies by a 
link with the ”naturalness” of the nation 
(the policy must be better if it is ”made in 
Wales”). Similarly, articulating policies as 
based upon a agenda of ”clear red water” 
constructs two signifi cant 
political linkages: Firstly, 
it links those policies to 
the notion that they’re 
socialist (i.e. ”red”), 
concurrently depicting it 
as more socialist (”redder”) 
than the policy options 
(real or abstract) chosen 
on the other side of the 
”water” (e.g. in England). 
Secondly, through a logic 
of differentiation (i.e. 
”water” representing a 
”border” – Offar’s Dyke(?) 
– and ”red” the colour of 
Wales as embodied in the 
draig coch (Welsh dragon) the policy is linked 
with ”Welshness” and those disagreeing 
with it, therefore, with non-/anti-Welshness. 
In  each case, Welsh Labour articulates its 
politics via rhetoric centred upon Welsh 
specifi city and differentiation from an 
(England-based) ”Other” rather than 
universal (international) principles such as 
equality or freedom. This, perhaps, might 
explain the limited wider infl uence the ideas 
and policies linked to such rhetoric have had 
within Labour outside of Wales; emphasising 
their adoption and composition as specifi cally 
”Welsh” and ”anti-Westminster” means they 
were also thus bounded. Arguably, such is 
the necessity of the new sub-polity politics; 
there is evidence, however, that this approach 
may change. Peter Hain MP, for instance, has 
declared that ”Welsh labour needs to ensure that 
there is not an over-emphasis on fi nding ‘Wales-
only’ solutions for their own sake” and spoken 
of the need to offer ”policies which are not 
defi ned by their ‘Welshness’ or ‘redness’ but by 
the quality of their outcomes for Welsh citizens”. 
With Rhodri Morgan’s tenure as leader shortly 
to end, Welsh Labour’s future direction 
– both in terms of policies and portrayal – 
should be up for debate. One question worth 
contemplating for party members is whether 
a change in how Welsh Labour articulates 
its politics might mean greater infl uence 
within the party as a whole. Whether the 
devolved settlement precludes universalist 
rhetoric and benefi ts differentiation via 
nation is a problem which a self-defi ned 
internationalist party like Labour has to face.
Welsh Labour and the problem of bounded rhetoric
By David S. Moon
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”Under the devolved 
system [...] Welsh Labour 
clearly has a good deal of 
autonomy. On the other 
hand, policywise, Welsh 
Labour doesn’t appear to 
have much infl uence; there 
seems little sign their 
different policy route has 
signifi cantly impacted 
thinking within the central 
party leadership...”
Rhodri Morgan, Welsh fi rst minister and leader 
of Welsh Labour since 2000, coined the rhetoric 
of “clear red water” to describe his government’s 
policy approach.            © National Assembly for Wales
The benefi ciaries. 
Devolution has added 
a new dimension 
to British party 
politics, traditionally 
renowned for its 
centralisation around 
key institutions in 
London . Among 
the UK-wide 
British parties, the 
change has been 
particularly benefi cial 
for the Liberal 
Democrats. With the 
establishment of the 
Scottish Parliament 
and the Welsh 
Assembly, Britain 
has moved a little bit 
closer to the Liberal 
Democrat vision of 
separate federal structures for England 
, Scotland and Wales (although England 
has fallen behind, as discussed by John 
Redwood and Charlie Jeffery elsewhere 
in the Review). From this perspective, it is 
arguably the Liberal Democrats that have 
been one of the parties to gain most from 
devolution.
Since devolution was introduced, Liberal 
Democrats have been in government 
in both Scotland and Wales , achieved 
notable results in terms of policy and 
steadily increased their party strength 
in each nation. The Scottish Liberal 
Democrats stand out in this respect, 
having served in the Scottish government 
with Labour from 1999 to 2007 while 
at the same time maintaining a strong 
presence in the federal (UK-wide) party 
in London . In the same period, the Scots 
Charles Kennedy and Menzies Campbell 
have also been infl uential leaders of the 
federal party. What of the Welsh then? 
This short article hopes to shed a little 
light on what has been happening to 
the Welsh Liberal Democrats over the 
last decade and whether devolution has 
been equally good for them.
First let us start with dismissing a basic 
assumption of British politics. It is that 
the three main parties – the Conservative 
Party, Labour and the Liberal Democrats 
– are all unitary parties with regional 
structures subservient to London. This 
is not the case at all with the Liberal 
Democrats, who since 1966 have been a 
federal party with separate state parties 
for England, Scotland and Wales. 
These state parties have their own 
constitutions, organisational structures 
and rules and policy determination 
mechanisms. 
In Wales, the distinctiveness of the Welsh 
Liberals goes back to the establishment 
of the Welsh Liberal council in 1897, 
although the party was only established 
as a state party in 1966. Since then, the 
party in Wales has acted independently 
of that in England on a whole host of 
policy and internal party managerial 
issues. These arrangements are based 
around the Liberal Democrat vision of a 
federal United Kingdom, which would 
see full-fl edged parliaments in Wales and 
the English regions mirroring that which 
now exists in Scotland. 
The party, however, is 
still interlinked with the 
federal party in reserved 
policy areas such as 
defence, international 
affairs and the broad 
lines of taxation.
After its heyday in the 
early 1900s, the Welsh 
Liberals were caught 
in what seemed to be 
terminal decline, going 
from 33 Welsh MPs in 
1906 to just one in 1966. 
The problems continued: 
from 1966 to 1999 the 
Welsh Liberal Democrats never controlled 
a single Welsh council outright, they 
never had more than eight per cent of 
the Welsh MPs and didn’t win one of the 
fi ve Members of the European Parliament 
set aside for Wales. Administratively, the 
Welsh party was limited to just one full-
time offi cial. Liberals looked forward 
to the new democratic institution of the 
Welsh Assembly, not only for bringing 
life to Welsh democracy but in the hope 
that devolution would return the party 
from the political wilderness. 
The electoral system for the Welsh 
Assembly allocates 40 Assembly 
Members (AMs) from single-member 
constituencies and then adds 20 AMs 
from regional party lists: this ensures that 
the distribution of seats is proportional 
to the election result. In 1999, the Welsh 
Liberal Democrats publicly spoke of 
winning ten of the Welsh Assembly’s 60 
seats in the fi rst election in 1999. In the 
end they won six, of which three were 
constituency seats and 
three from the party 
lists. In the process, 
three women and three 
men were elected for 
the party. This ensured 
exact gender equity, 
which was coincidental 
as the Welsh party had 
rejected any gender 
balancing of candidates. 
Nevertheless, the 
inclusive representation 
of the Liberal Democrats 
refl ected the new politics 
which devolution 
had been supposed 
to awaken. Most 
importantly, devolution also brought 
administrative benefi ts for the party. Its 
full-time offi cial was now supplemented 
by a raft of other offi cers and support staff 
bringing the party’s staff and researcher 
up to around 30 in total.
Michael German became the Welsh 
Liberal Democrats’ leader in the Assembly 
and from 2007 the party’s overall leader 
in Wales. All the party’s six AMs would 
remain the same for the next decade. At 
the following two Assembly elections, 
the same members were elected for 
the same seats, leaving the party in 
a situation of strong parliamentary 
continuity. No matter what tactics the 
party used at elections or whether they 
were in government or opposition they 
could not seem to break away from 
these six seats and these six people. By 
this development, the Welsh Liberal 
Democrats have become the most 
stable of all of the political parties in 
the Welsh Assembly. Whereas the 2005 
general election saw the party double 
its number of MPs in Wales (from two 
to four) and the 2004 local government 
elections gave the party enough seats to 
lead four councils, including the capital 
Cardiff, these advances never seemed 
to translate into the Welsh Assembly 
results.
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”The Liberal Democrats 
have since 1966 been 
a federal party with 
separate state parties 
for England, Scotland 
and Wales. These state 
parties have their 
own constitutions, 
o r g a n i s a t i o n a l 
structures and rules 
and policy-making 
mechanisms.”
The legacy. David Lloyd George, a Welshman and a Liberal. 
British prime minister from 1916-22 and the man behind the 
”People’s Budget” in 1909, Lloyd George was the last giant of 
the Liberal era -  in British politics and in Wales. 
photograph: public domain
The highpoint for the Welsh Liberal 
Democrats in devolutionary terms came 
with the coalition pact with Labour to 
run the Welsh Assembly Government 
between 2000 and 2003. Michael German 
took the post of deputy fi rst minister and 
Jenny Randerson that of culture minister. 
Coalition offered the party its fi rst taste 
of government since 1945 and in the 
process made Jenny Randerson the fi rst 
female Liberal to hold offi ce anywhere 
in the United Kingdom 
in the party’s history. 
The Scottish Liberal 
Democrats, despite its 
eight years in coalition 
(1999-2007), never had a 
female minister. Working 
in coalition with Labour, 
the Welsh Liberal 
Democrats managed to 
get nearly all of its 1999 
manifesto promises 
enacted, including the 
scrapping of top-up 
fees for Welsh students 
at Welsh universities 
and free entry to Wales state-owned 
museums.
Government commissions mandated 
in this period also recommended the 
introduction of single transferable vote for 
Welsh local government elections (a fully 
proportional electoral system) and reform 
to allow the Welsh Assembly primary 
law-making powers and enhanced status 
vis-à-vis London. Both were key Liberal 
Democrat aims. The problem for the Welsh 
Liberal Democrats was that once they were 
out of power in 2003, the Welsh Labour 
government or (from 2007 onwards) the 
Labour-Plaid Cymru coalition rejected 
the Commissions’ proposals, watered 
them down considerably or, in the case 
of university top-up fees, reversed 
them. Thus, over time the Welsh Liberal 
Democrats’ legacy of government has 
become less and less prevalent.
Devolution, with its different locations of 
power and infl uence, has been a challenge 
to handle even for the Liberal Democrats, 
a party which was well-prepared for 
separate policy-making in Scotland and 
Wales. The initial period of devolution 
saw strained relations between the AMs 
in Cardiff Bay and the party’s MPs and 
Lords in Westminster. Adjusting to the 
situation of differing power bases and 
a shift in Welsh party emphasis was 
problematic. The Westminster MPs were 
no longer the “top dogs” in the party. 
By 2003, however, these diffi culties had 
been smoothed out and from then on the 
Westminster and Cardiff politicians were 
able to work in much closer harmony. The 
fi nal result of this power shift was that 
the party’s Welsh leadership transferred 
from the Westminster MPs to the Welsh 
AMs in 2007. 
The Welsh Assembly has opened a new 
arena for enacting policies that are separate 
from those elsewhere in Britain. In the 
Liberal Democrats, the state party had 
already in the previous decades shaped 
its own policy to be promoted in the UK 
Parliament. Today, policy divergence is 
becoming a matter of routine in devolved 
issue areas. If we take 
one example on health, 
the English Liberal 
Democrats would drive 
forward the health agenda 
with locally elected Local 
Health Boards (LHBs). In 
Wales, the party wishes 
to see LHBs abolished 
entirely and replaced by 
large centralised bodies 
responsible for both health 
care commissioning and 
delivery. In Scotland, 
however, there are no 
LHBs and therefore the 
party policy there is to support elected 
local government councillors presence on 
Scottish Community Health Partnerships. 
Thus, there are three distinct policies from 
the three Liberal Democrat state parties. 
After 2003, the Welsh Liberal Democrats 
went into a long period of opposition. 
The 2007 Welsh general election, 
however, brought Labour fi ve seats short 
of a majority and therefore in need of a 
coalition partner. Initially it was thought 
that Plaid Cymru, the Conservatives 
and the Welsh Liberal Democrats would 
join together into a so-called “rainbow 
alliance”, in order to form a government 
excluding the Labour party. Plaid Cymru, 
however, were ideologically opposed to 
joining with the Conservatives due to 
their strong unionist background. The 
Welsh Liberal Democrats became split on 
the issue, the party’s executive divided 
down the middle. Whilst the party 
sought to sort itself out, Plaid Cymru 
did a surprise deal with the Labour 
Party, their traditional foe and the Welsh 
Liberal Democrats were once more left 
out in the cold.  
The poor 2007 Welsh Assembly result 
for the party also led to increasing 
pressure from within the party for party 
leader Michael German to step down. 
This he duly did in December 2008. The 
candidates for his post were both female 
AMs, Jenny Randerson and Kirsty 
Williams. It was Williams who won with 
60 per cent of vote. She is a renowned 
orator and appealed to those in the party 
who wanted to break away from the 
more traditional image of Welsh politics 
being led by “old men in grey suits”. 
Williams was not only the fi rst female to 
lead a Liberal state party in the United 
Kingdom but at the age of 37 she was also 
the youngest. Her fi rst real leadership test 
will come in June 2009 when the party 
seeks to win its fi rst ever Member of the 
European Parliament for Wales. 
Over the last decade the Welsh Assembly 
has been a huge boost for the Welsh 
Liberal Democrats. Before the 1997 
general election that paved the way 
to the Welsh Assembly, the party had 
limited administrative resources and, 
indeed, limited arenas to play out its 
vision for Welsh politics. Today, the 
party has around 35 full- and part-time 
offi cials and support staff. Even more 
importantly, it has in total ten elected 
parliamentarians in Cardiff (six AMs) 
and Westminster (four MPs). It also holds 
the leadership or deputy leadership of the 
councils that represent the Welsh capital, 
Cardiff and its other two cities, Swansea 
and Newport. 
The Welsh Liberal Democrats have thus 
become an important actor in the new 
politics evolving since 1999. No longer 
is the Welsh political scene constrained 
to a Labour-dominated group of MPs in 
Westminster. Although the Welsh Liberal 
Democrats failed to get back into the 
Assembly government after 2003, they are 
almost immeasurably stronger and more 
united as a political force in Wales than 
the party has been since the 1920s. 
In sum, then, devolution has made the 
Welsh Liberal Democrats a strong political 
force once more, despite the fact that only 
few outside of Wales have noticed it. 
The next decade will show whether the 
enhanced impact of the Liberal Democrats 
in both Scotland and Wales can be 
maintained and indeed refl ect back upon 
on the party’s role in Westminster.
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By Russell Deacon
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”Before the 1997 general 
election [...], the party had 
just one full-time party 
offi cial and one elected 
parliamentarian. Today 
it has around 35 full and 
part-time offi cials and 
support staff. Even more 
importantly, it has 10 
elected parliamentarians 
in Cardiff and 
Westminster.”
New politics, new 
gender balance? 
I n s t i t u t i o n a l 
support for 
gender equality 
in the devolved 
Scotland has been 





c o n t i n u o u s l y 
in the ten years 
of devolved 
government in 
Scotland.  This 
short article briefl y 
considers the main 
structural and 
policy changes to 
promote gender 
equality introduced by devolution, and 
offers a critical perspective on the extent 
to which gender equality has become 
embedded in public policy institutions 
and practice in this period. Particular 
attention is drawn to the activities of the 
Scottish Women’s Budget Group and the 
attempts to promote a more gender-aware 
approach to the budget process within a 
Scottish public policy context.
The creation of a Scottish Parliament and 
devolved government in Scotland heralded 
a new era for equalities. Within the range 
of pro-reform coalitions prevalent at this 
time, drawn from political parties and 
across civil society, the movement for 
gender balance in elected representation 
and the promotion of women in political 
life had a signifi cantly high profi le. 
Thus the prospect of political change in 
Scotland “marked a period of signifi cant 
political and economic change in Scotland 
which served to present women activists 
in Scotland with an opportunity to work 
together and make a difference” (McKay 
et al 2002, 3). Indeed, within the context 
of the Scottish devolution settlement, 
the role and infl uence of the campaigns 
for women’s representation as well as 
the promotion and adoption of gender 
”equality” mainstreaming in the new 
institutions is well documented in the 
literature (see for example Breitenbach 
& Mackay 2001). As a result of sustained 
and highly visible campaigning the 50:50 
campaign for equal representation was 
instrumental in delivering unprecedented 
levels of women’s direct representation 
in the new Scottish Parliament - 42% in 
1999, which was then the highest level of 
women’s parliamentary representation in 
Western Europe.
Equality and concepts of equal 
opportunities had also been visible 
demands in the campaign 
for devolved, or delegated, 
government within the 
UK.  Although not viewed 
by all as a key priority 
for the new institutions, 
certain critical actors from 
the women’s movement, 
trade unions, and 
statutory commissions 
ensured, by their access to 
decisions on the structure 
of the new institutions, 
that equality became a 
touchstone of the “new Scotland”. In 1997, 
following the successful referendum for 
devolution, the Consultative Steering 
Group (CSG) was established to devise 
rules and procedures for the new Scottish 
Parliament.  Its four founding principles 
were: openness and accountability, 
transparency and, crucially, that “the 
Scottish Parliament in its operation and 
its appointments should recognise the 
need to promote equal opportunities for 
all” (CSG Report 1998, 3).
The CSG further proposed that to give 
practical effect to the principle of equal 
opportunities there should be a mandatory 
Equal Opportunities Committee of the 
Parliament; a specifi c department within 
the Scottish Government (which became 
the ”Equality Unit”); and that “the aim 
must be to embed into the process of 
policy formulation and the way in which 
the Parliament works, the principles 
and commitment to promote equal 
opportunities for all and to eliminate the 
effects of past discrimination” (op.cit:146). 
These measures sought to position equal 
opportunities at the heart of public policy 
in Scotland along with the machinery, 
potentially, to deliver effective policy 
analysis and content.
In November 2000 the fi rst Scottish 
Executive’s plan for equality - Equality 
Strategy: Working Together for Equality - was 
published.  Equalities mainstreaming 
was the cornerstone of the strategy 
and the approach to public policy. It 
is important to note the breadth of the 
defi nition of equal opportunities and the 
use of the concept of “equalities”. Within 
this framework, different aspects of 
“equality” were to be given equal weight 
in policy considerations, resulting in 
what could critically be perceived as 
a dilution of focus and potency on 
questions of gender equality.
Around the inception of 
the new parliamentary 
and governmental 
institutions, the Scottish 
Women’s Budget Group 
(SWBG) was formed. 
A group of women 
activists from across 
academia, the voluntary 
and public sectors, and 
private individuals, 
they were and continue 
to be committed to the 
promotion of Gender Budget Analysis 
(GBA), in the operations of the new 
institutions.  Opportunities for access to 
key politicians possible in the very early 
days of the Scottish Parliament secured 
SWBG the commitment of the fi rst 
fi nance minister. This in turn resulted, 
in 2000, in the creation of an advisory 
group within the Scottish Executive, 
charged with developing an approach 
to equality proofi ng the budget.  Known 
as the Equality Proofi ng Budgets Policy 
Advisory Group this entity continues 
to exist today, and retains a mixed 
membership of government offi cials 
– primarily the Finance and Local 
Government Divisions, Statistics, the 
Equality Unit, and external groups such 
as the SWBG, the Equality and Human 
Rights Commission, and the Equality 
Network.
It is fair to say that progress on effective 
implementation of equality analysis of 
the Scottish budgetary process to date 
has been mixed. A number of signifi cant 
successes are evident, as are a range of 
ongoing tensions. Most positively, support 
from the Finance and Equal Opportunities 
Committees of the Scottish Parliament 
who gave clear direction to the Scottish 
Government to ensure equality was a 
visible element of the budgetary process 
and accompanying documentation. This 
resulted in the key achievement of the 
inclusion of equality statements in the 
Scottish Spending Plans 2003-2006, and 
the substantial references to equality in 
the Scottish Budget 2003-2004. However, 
these were singular advances and have 
not been repeated since.
As the legal and institutional backdrop to 
gender equality in the UK has changed, 
there has been increasing pressure to 
maintain visible commitments and 
actions to eliminate sex discrimination 
and particularly women’s inequality.
”The new politics in 
Scotland has been built 
around values distinct 
from the adversarial 
politics in Westminster. 
Yet aspirations for 
gender equality need to 
be fought for within the 
new institutions to be 
maintained.”
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Percentage of women among elected representatives (2008)
UK House of Commons   19,6 %
   Scottish Parliament    34,9 %
 Welsh Assembly    46,7 %
   Norwegian Parliament (Stortinget)              37,9 %
   Swedish Parliament (Riksdagen)  47,3%
These are core concerns of SWBG and 
other feminist organizations, but are 
increasingly less visible in dominant 
narratives on equality. In part, the 
attempts to promote equality assessment, 
specifi cally gender equality, of the 
Scottish budgetary process have struggled 
for support within successive framing 
of equality policy at both the national 
(UK) level and within the Scottish policy 
context.
In the fi rst two terms of the Scottish 
Parliament (1999-2007), a key focus of 
the Labour-Liberal Democrat coalition 
government was the promotion of social 
inclusion, subsequently social justice, 
and fi nally captured under the policy 
framework of Closing the Opportunity 
Gap. SWGB consistently raised their 
concern that the framing of equality 
within these policy priorities increasingly 
confl ated concepts of economic equality 
and disadvantage with structural 
inequality and sex discrimination, with 
the latter concepts losing purchase and 
resonance. Under the current Scottish 
Government, the commitment to equality 
is less visible externally, and the last round 
of budget documentation contained no 
references to mainstreaming, and only 
one to equality; down from a peak of 9 
references to mainstreaming in 2004 and 
96 references to equality in 2006.
More positively, the introduction of 
the Public Sector Duties as explicit 
requirements to promote equality may 
offer some support to build on the 
foundations of equality proofi ng the 
Scottish Budget and to mainstream 
equality into all policy, programme, and 
spending decisions of public bodies. The 
duties require public bodies to conduct 
equality impact assessments of all policy 
and, it can be argued, spending decisions. 
SWBG and others are looking to the 
provisions of the current Gender Equality 
Duty to be effectively implemented by the 
Scottish Government and public bodies 
funded in Scotland, and to the provisions 
of the new Single Equality Bill introduced 
by the UK government to provide legal 
support for the principle of equality 
analysis in budget- setting processes.
In conclusion, it appears that there 
have been signifi cant advances and 
achievements. However, while the 
principle of equality analysis of the 
Scottish budget may be embedded within 
the appropriate political institutions, the 
practice in the budgetary process is not 
entrenched and is therefore vulnerable 
to political change and altered policy 
priorities. The progress achieved to date 
has been secured by effective lobbying 
and infl uencing by SWBG, based on 
knowledge gathering and policy learning 
from other experiences globally; and 
by the willingness of key individuals, 
including politicians and offi cials, to act 
to support the principle and its application 
in practice. EPBPAG continues to exist 
and to be the touchstone for the current 
Scottish Government’s commitment to 
continue to work towards the process of 
equality proofi ng the Scottish Budget. 
The Equal Opportunities Committee, 
in all its different compositions over the 
last decade, has retained a consistent 
commitment to and interest in the use 
of the national budget as a key tool in 
the promotion and delivery of equality 
policy.
There is no doubt that devolution and the 
creation of the new institutions provided 
the opportunity for a new approach to 
equality policy to be promoted, and 
that there were signifi cant responses 
to that opportunity as evidenced in the 
machinery introduced to support it. 
The founding principles of the Scottish 
Parliament of equality of opportunity, 
transparency, accountability and 
accessibility were key ingredients of the 
much-heralded “new politics” thought 
to be possible in Scotland.  GBA as a 
concept, and the access of the SWBG 
early on, are testament to the newness 
of the institutions and the principles to 
which they aspired.
Devolution opened up Scottish political 
institutions, at least for a brief moment, 
to allow access for groups like SWBG 
who have maintained their presence and 
authority by building their knowledge 
and key alliances nationally and 
internationally. SWBG continues to press 
for change and is an effective advocate 
within EPBPAG and to the parliamentary 
committees. So while this is all evidence 
of a greater plurality to the dimensions 
of Scottish politics, the intermittent 
progress on commitments to gender 
equality in the Scottish budget process 
is also evidence of a variable political 
commitment and a failure to embed the 
practice deep in the workings of Scottish 
government to date. The new politics in 
Scotland has been built around values 
distinct from the adversarial politics in 
Westminster. Yet aspirations for gender 
equality need to be fought for within the 
new institutions to be maintained.
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Annabel Goldie, Leader of the Conservatives in the 
Scottish Parliament and presently the only female 
leader in the four dominant parties in Scotland.      
© Scottish Conservatives
An uncertain future. 
Devolution was never 
a carefully thought-
through set of reforms. 
It was founded on 
the key goals of 
maintaining the UK as a 
single state by granting 
limited measures of 
self-government to 
Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland, 
while not altering 
such key aspects of the 
state as the powers of 
the UK Parliament or 
representation in it, the 
way devolved services 
in Scotland and Wales 
were financed, or the 
single UK economy, 
labour market and 
system of social security. 
The devolved administrations 
were therefore not much more than 
popularly-elected spending agencies. 
The organisation and practice of 
government in Whitehall did not change, 
nor was there any significant devolution 
within England. The upshot was that 
devolution is deeply asymmetric, with 
different institutions in Scotland, 
Wales and Northern Ireland each with 
different powers, different interests 
and different relationships with UK 
institutions. It represents a form of 
pragmatic incrementalism taken to a 
high degree.  
It was quite possible to maintain a 
system with all these internal tensions 
and contradictions while times were 
good – while Labour dominated all three 
British governments and had strong 
public support, and while the economy 
was healthy and public spending was 
growing. The times are not good any 
more. Labour in London has to contend 
with a coalition with Plaid Cymru in 
Wales, a minority SNP government 
in Scotland, great pressure on public 
spending, and the likelihood of a 
Conservative UK Government by the 
summer of 2010. That makes life difficult 
for all the actors involved – whether it is 
the future Tory government, or Labour 
interests in Scotland or Wales. What are 
the options for how devolution might 
develop in the future?  
Break-up of the UK 
Perhaps it is best to start with the most 
apocalyptic scenario. The UK could 
break up, with Scotland becoming an 
independent state, perhaps followed in 
due course by Wales. The desire of the 
SNP to achieve this is only a small part 
of the story – independence seldom gets 
more than the support of 30 per cent 
of the Scottish public in opinion polls, 
and the SNP’s picture of an economic 
future for Scotland as part of an “arc 
of prosperity” has taken a severe dent 
with the economic collapses of Ireland 
and Iceland, and with the need for a UK 
Government bail-out of the totemically 
Scottish banks. But it remains a realistic 
possibility, as much for reasons of 
politics elsewhere in Britain as for 
purely Scottish factors.   
The key factor is where the British 
parties draw their 
support from. As 
the Conservatives’ 
electoral base is 
principally in England, 
the party has flirted in 
the past with forms of 
”English nationalism” 
which certainly appeal 
to its core voters and 
supporters in the media. 
Consequently, the 
idea of Conservatives 
saying “stuff the 
Scots” (and Welsh) has 
considerable political 
logic. David Cameron 
has made it clear that 
he is opposed to this – that he is a strong 
unionist, who is happy to “respect” and 
work with the devolved institutions in 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, 
while viewing them as integral parts of 
the UK. So Conservative willingness to 
embrace break-up so they can pursue 
“English” policies without hindrance 
seems unlikely – although under a 
different leader, that might change.  
A more likely scenario for break-
up would be a Conservative UK 
government that sought to maintain 
the constitutional status quo while 
exercising to the full the powers that 
the UK Government retains. This would 
cause serious intergovernmental friction 
with Scotland and Wales (not least 
because the Welsh arrangements call for 
the incremental increase in the powers 
of the National Assembly), while doing 
nothing to redress English concerns 
about the implications of devolution 
and the favourable treatment Scotland 
is perceived to get. A Conservative UK 
Government that pursued Thatcherite 
policies would rapidly polarise the issue. 
Faced with financial stringency and the 
limited support for the Conservatives 
in Scotland or Wales, it would be easy 
for political nationalists in Scotland 
and Wales to offer the choice between 
remaining subject to an unsympathetic, 
even illegitimate UK Government 
and opting for an independent social-
democratic state. That would be a hard 
choice for many traditional Labour 
voters in Scotland and Wales, especially 
if they see little chance of a suitable 
Labour government returning to power 
at UK level.
  
A decentralised social-democratic 
union 
If Labour had seized the opportunities 
open to it, it could have used 
devolution to embed a form of social 
democracy that would seriously inhibit 
Conservative ambitions – ensuring 
that there were political bastions for 
Labour in Scotland and Wales, and 
that the institutions 
to support these 
gave effect to social 
democratic values. 
This would have 
involved explicitly 
identifying the UK 




social rights prevailed 
across the whole 
country, supported 
by a redistributive 
financial framework 
and a great deal of 
autonomy in delivery 
within that framework.
Labour however ducked the opportunity 
to do this explicitly, largely because 
doing redistribution properly would 
mean reducing the generous funding 
Scotland receives thanks to the 
Barnett formula, as well as opening 
up difficult questions about England. 
While elements of this approach may 
underpin the work of the Commission 
on Scottish Devolution chaired by 
Sir Kenneth Calman (due to report in 
June or July 2009), that will only be to 
a limited extent. In any case, time will 
be very short for Labour to implement 
proposals arising from the Commission 
(it will have less than six months of 
Parliamentary time). This opportunity 
is, for practical purposes, off the cards.  
Devolution plus 
This means that some form of extended 
devolution becomes very attractive 
to all involved, in London as well as 
Edinburgh or Cardiff. Such an approach 
would involve some extensions in 
devolved legislative powers (though in 
Scotland it is hard to identify what these 
might be without starting to fragment 
the integrated UK economy, labour 
market and system of social security), 
along with changes in the financial 
system. These would probably involve a 
measure of fiscal autonomy, at least for 
Scotland, along with a reconstructed 
basis for grant so that it related more 
directly to need.
Where does devolution go next? Options for the next decade
By Alan Trench
”[A] Conservative UK 
government that sought to 
maintain the constitutional 
status quo while exercising 
to the full the powers 
that the UK Government 
retains [...] would cause 
serious intergovernmental 
friction with Scotland and 
Wales, while doing nothing 
to redress English concerns 
about the implications of 
devolution...”
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This would enable and require the 
Scottish Government to pay for better 
public services from resources available 
within Scotland, while also making it 
more acceptable in England.  For Wales, 
this approach would mean holding the 
referendum and bring in the “primary 
legislative powers” set out in Part 4 of 
the Government of Wales Act 2006 as 
soon as possible.
How far a UK Government might wish 
to go down this path is one of the big 
questions. If it were determined to 
resist Scottish independence but had 
to deal with a strong SNP, it might go 
a long way down it. But it will have to 
balance that against the views of its 
own members and MPs, and also the 
problems that arise from the sort of deep 
asymmetry that would imply. Indeed, 
one of the big issues 
for the UK institutions 
generally is whether 
they wish to continue to 
manage relations with 
Scotland and Wales 
(and Northern Ireland) 
bilaterally, or to try to do 
so more multilaterally. 
The problems caused 
by three sets of bilateral 
relationships are starting 
to increase.
Conclusions
Devolution bedded in 
easily, and had an easy 
time during the first two 
terms of the devolved 
legislatures. Perhaps 
people did not realise just 
how easy times were 
then. Governments, 
particularly in London, 
made little effort to 
ensure that the system 
was robust and durable 
while the going was 
good. It clearly cannot 
cope with the strains to 
which it is now subject, 
so change is inevitable. 
The big question will 
be how imaginative 
and forward-thinking 
a new Conservative 
government – which will 
have to face these issues 
– will be.
Growth in the 
shadows. Devolution 
has traditionally been 
piloted by demands from 
Scotland. It can safely be 
argued that it was the 
case of Scotland which 
brought devolution onto 
the political agenda in 
the second half of the 
20th century (in the same 
way as it was the case 
of Ireland which forced 
British politicians to 
consider devolution or 
“home rule” in the second 
half of the 19th century). 
Wales never took centre 
stage, and when the fi rst serious attempt 
was made to introduce devolution to 
Scotland and Wales in 1979, the future 
government of Scotland was the main 
concern. Moreover, the results in the two 
referenda which were held to decide the 
matter demonstrated that the support 
for devolution in Wales was very limited 
indeed. While the Scots produced a 
majority of 51.6% in favour of devolution 
on a turnout of 68.3% of the electorate 
(though the result was overruled on the 
basis of the additional requirement that 
more than 40% of the total electorate vote 
in favour), the Welsh rejected devolution 
by a massive majority of 79.4% against on 
a meagre turnout of 59.3%.
When the question of devolution came 
up again in 1997, it still seemed to be the 
case that it was the Scots who sought and 
supported devolution. A comfortable 
74.3% voted in favour in the referendum 
on a Scottish Parliament with legislative 
powers, on a turnout of 60.4%, while the 
referendum held in Wales on the question 
of a Welsh Assembly without such powers 
produced only the slimmest of majorities 
in favour. A marginal majority of 50.3% of 
the voters supported devolution to Wales, 
with a turnout of only 50.1%. Since the 
devolved legislatures were opened in 1999, 
the focus has also been primarily on the 
Scottish Parliament, an attention which 
has been further strengthened by the 
advent of the SNP minority government 
in 2007.
Nevertheless, there is a good case for 
arguing that some of the most signifi cant 
current developments are taking place 
in Wales. First of all, it is clear that 
the Welsh have been 
warming to devolution 
for a considerable period 
of time. The very slim 
majority achieved in 
1997 may mask the 
fact that the growth in 
support for devolution 
from 1979 to 1997 was 
quite simply remarkable, 
and far more so than 
in Scotland. Moreover, 
this development has continued after 
the Assembly was opened in 1999, to the 
extent that about three quarters of the 
Welsh electorate now support devolution.
The Welsh have thus clearly grown 
accustomed to – and taken a liking to – both 
the principle of devolution and devolution 
in practice. What is more, people in Wales 
have grown suffi ciently accustomed to 
devolution for many of them to request 
that more power be invested in the Welsh 
Assembly. They have seen how the primary 
legislative powers given to the Scottish 
Parliament have made that institution far 
more effective than the Welsh Assembly, 
whose proposals for new laws have to 
go via Westminster before they can be 
implemented.
Through the 2006 Government of Wales 
Act, the present Labour government has 
responded to the call for more devolution 
to Wales, though only in a partial manner. 
The Act provides for a more streamlined 
process of passing legislation for Wales, 
but does not yet provide the Welsh 
Assembly with primary legislative 
powers (although it contains provisions 
for a future implementation of such 
powers).
Several reasons for Labour’s reluctance 
can be cited. On the one hand, there is 
the “shadow of 1979” – the view that the 
Welsh cannot really be trusted 
to support devolution, 
and that the government 
might consequently lose 
a referendum on giving 
greater powers to the Welsh 
Assembly. On the other hand, 
there is also a matter of party 
political consideration in 
play. If the Welsh Assembly 
was given similar powers 
to the Scottish Parliament, 
Welsh representation in Westminster 
would be expected to be reduced in the 
same fashion as the number of Scottish 
MPs was reduced before the 2005 
election. And who would stand to lose 
from a reduction in the number of Welsh 
MPs, if not Labour? Until this reluctance 
is surmounted, the Welsh will have to 
contend with a devolution arrangement 
which is second rate to that of Scotland 
and which thus maintains the diffi cult 
asymmetric structure of devolution.
I am indebted to Professor Richard Wyn Jones 
at the University of Cardiff for generously 
providing me with material on devolution to 
Wales.
Unionism or England? David 
Cameron may hold the key to the 
future course of devolution should 
he become Britain’s next prime 
minister.                       photograph: public domain
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”People in Wales have 
grown suffi ciently 
accustomed to 
devolution for many 
of them to request 
that more power be 
invested in the Welsh 
Assembly.”
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2008 has been yet another 
important and agreeable 
year for the British Politics 
Society, Norway. The 
society has carried out 
a number of activities, 
including the publication 
of four issues of British 
Politics Review. The society also acted as 
host for a seminar with highly profi led 
speakers.
The topic of issue 1/08 of British Politics 
Review, released in mid-February, 
was Britain’s long-term ambivalent 
relationship with continental Europe. 35 
years had passed since Britain entered the 
European Union (EU), and a competent 
group of guest writers contributed with 
articles sharing their views on this and 
related issues. They included Jan Petersen 
MP, Dag Seierstad, Victor Rothwell, Ian 
Bache and Bjørn Høyland.
On 15 April, the society followed up 
by hosting a seminar to mark the 
anniversary of Britain’s entry into the 
EU. The seminar took place at Blindern 
University campus, in collaboration 
with the Department of Political Science, 
University of Oslo. The Rt. Hon. Kenneth 
Clarke MP, a former British Home Secretary 
and Chancellor of the Exchequer in John 
Major’ Conservative governments, shared 
his thoughts on Britain’s approach to 
Europe. Professor Ian Bache from Sheffi eld 
University followed with an engaging 
presentation of “the quiet Europeanisation 
of British politics”. On the Norwegian 
side, the experienced Labour MP Marit 
Nybakk gave a presentation of Norwegian 
relations with the EU, and pointed at 
differences and similarities with the 
British case.
A few days prior to the event, board 
members Øivind Bratberg and Kristin 
M. Haugevik published an Op. Ed. on the 
linkages between Norway and Britain’s 
approaches to the EU, in the Norwegian 
newspaper VG.
In mid-May, issue 2/08 of British 
Politics Review was released. The issue 
dealt with the causes, conduct and 
consequences of the British Empire. 
Guest contributors were Peter Cain, 
John Erik Fossum, Jeremy A. Crang and 
Jacob Lothe.
Around the same time, the society 
arranged its second ordinary Annual 
General Meeting. At this meeting, 
Øivind Bratberg and John-Ivar Svinsås 
Olsen were re-elected as, respectively, 
president and secretary of the society 
for another two-year period. Similarly, 
Kristin M. Haugevik and Atle L. Wold 
were re-elected as, respectively, vice-
president and scholarly responsible 
for another year. In addition, Ragnhild 
Vestli was elected as deputy board member. 
Other key topics on the meeting agenda 
were the approval of the annual accounts 
for 2007 and the budget for 2008.
Issue 3/08 of British Politics Review 
appeared in August, and discussed 
visions and prospects for British 
environmentalism. The many guest 
contributors included Thorbjørn Berntsen, 
Martin Horwood MP, Martin White, David 
J. Hutchinson, Hans Andreas Starheim, 
Ellen Svendsen, Tiina Ruohonen, Christian 
Bjørnæs, Mark Brown and Lars Mediaas. 
In issue 4/08, released in November, the 
overall topic was the complex relations 
between Britain and the United States. 




D i c k i n s o n , 
Ragnhild Vestli, 
Johan Elsness 
and Alf Tomas 
Tønnessen.
In 2008, the 
board of 
British Politics 
S o c i e t y , 
Norway has 
consisted of Øivind Bratberg (President), 
Kristin M. Haugevik (Vice President), Atle 
L. Wold (Scholarly Responsible), John-
Ivar S. Olsen (Secretary) and Ragnhild 
Vestli (Deputy Board Member). 
The society has received fi nancial support 
in 2008 from the Department of Political 
Science at the University of Oslo and 
from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. All available funds for 2008 have 
been directed at covering the expenses 
for everyday management. The society’s 
main expenditure continues to be the 
printing and distribution of British Politics 
Review.
British Politics Society, Norway - 2008 in retrospect
Forthcoming edition of British Politics Review
Britishness has become 
a catchword where 
the basis for cohesion 
in today’s Britain is 
debated. Devolution, 
European integration 
and multiculturalism are 
developments which have 
put  Britishness under 
renewed scrutiny in later 
years. It has also been a 
favourite theme of the 
Prime Minister, Gordon 
Brown.
The next edition of British 
Politics Review raises 
the topic of Britishness. 
What does it essentially 
mean to be British? How 
valid is the perception of 
Britishness as a common 
bond of Englishmen, 
Welshmen and Scots 
today? Moreover, does 
Europe remain the 
antagonist in the narrative 
of what it is to be British?
The effects of 
multiculturalism on 
Britishness is also a topic 
worth investigating. 
To what extent are 
immigrants part of the 
common thread shared 
by Britons, and how is the 
imperial legacy integrated 
in the concept today?
Articles from readers of 
British Politics Review are 
very welcome. Please get 
in touch with the editors at 
mail@britishpoliticssociety.
no for further details.
The summer edition of 
British Politics Review is due 
to arrive in August 2009.
Would you like to become a member of the British 
Politics Society, Norway? Membership is open to 
everyone and includes 
- Subscription to four editions of British Politics   
Review
- Access to any event organised by the society
- The right to vote at our annual general meetings
Your membership comes into force as soon as the 
membership fee, NOK 100,- for one year, has been 
registered at our account  6094.05.67788.
For more information see our website at 
www.britishpoliticssociety.no
Membership
Britain and Europe 35 years: Kenneth Clarke MP gave the 
keynote address at the Society’s well-attended seminar on 
15 April 2008 marking the anniversary of Britain’s entry into 
the EU.                                         Photograph: Ragnar Lie
